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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
he long-standing significance of empowerment of females in developing countries is 
undoubtable, as women in these parts of the world have been lagging behind their male 
counterparts in reaping the benefits of human development. This global issue has continued 
to require the mobilization of human wisdom. However, in some developing countries, an 
issue has begun to remerge regarding boys’ underperformance in education2 compared to 
their female counterparts (UNGEI, 2012).  
 UNGEI (2012) directly highlights this issue with cases in four East and Southeast 
Asian countries: the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Mongolia. It determined boys’ 
underperformance from indices not only of access to education but also of quality or 
outcomes of education. Furthermore, Cambodia and Bangladesh, referred to as even lower 
income countries than UNGEI’s (2012) four countries, have also been reported as regions 
where females have started to overtake their male counterparts in education (Zimmermann 
and Williams, 2016; Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2009; Khandker et al., 2003).3  
 Outside the Asia and Pacific region, the same issue has been found in some Latin 
American countries (Kitamura, 2015). Surprisingly, though it is considered a patriarchal 
region, some Sub-Saharan African countries such as Lesotho and Malawi are reported to 
have experienced the same situation (Jha et al. 2012). These were reported with some sense 
of astonishment, whereas the school subject-based underperformance of one gender has 
been reported in developed countries (OECD, 2014). 
 If the boys’ underperformance in education merely meant the catch-ups of girls in 
those regions over time, we could interpret it as female outperformance of males, which is 
welcome. However, the situation is not that optimistic. Difficulties and barriers specific to 
male children have not been studied as much as in female cases (UNGEI, 2012). The literature 
dealing with boys’ issues is still developing, as the issues are “a more complex phenomenon 
than female disadvantages” in education because the male issue “coexists with higher social 
and economic positioning, and privileging within family” (Jha et al. 2012: 12). The issue 
leading to male underachievement in human capital accumulation processes, if it emerges 
more broadly, not only poses an obstacle to males’ own capability development but also can 
be of harm for women from a postfeminist perspective (Miralao, 2008).  
                                                        
2 In this paper the author uses the term “’boys’ underperformance’ in education.” The terms 
“underperform” and “boy” rather than “male” or “man” are derived from the terminology used 
by UNGEI (2012). 
3 According to Asadullah and Chaudhury (2009) and Khandker et al. (2003), the Bangladeshi 
government introduced an affirmative action called the female secondary stipend (FSS) program 
in 1994, which has been reported to increase girls’ secondary education. 
T 
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 This paper attempts to explore the source and background of the phenomenon in 
the Philippines under conditions of poverty. This research idea serves to address why boys 
from poorer families are more underperforming in education. The Filipino boys’ case of 
underperformance in education is persistent (Torres, 2011; UNGEI, 2012). Considerable 
literature has approached the issue from socioeconomic (demand-side) aspects. Keeping 
attention on the socioeconomic circumstances of students, this paper employs our latest 
primary data collected in a rural area in the Philippines to intentionally focus on a supply-
side bias to the students through school teachers’ perceived gender stereotypes. Thus far, 
gender disparity in education is regarded as being less serious in the Philippines (Fuwa, 
2014). This paper, therefore, attempts at contributing to the literature by providing 
explanations of a supply-side factor in the case of a relatively and seemingly gender-neutral 
society and by presenting the complexity of this contentious issue as described in Jha et al. 
(2012). 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section reviews the related literature on the possibility of teacher-perceived gender 
stereotypes as one of the predictors of boys’ underperformance in education. First, to 
organize the issue, this section first reviews the previous literature that has worked on how 
teacher- and school-related supply-side factors influence the disparities in educational 
achievement and outcomes among students aside from the demand-side factors such as the 
socioeconomic status (SES) of the students’ households.  
 The bottom line from the literature first depends on whether the setting is a 
developed or developing country. In the latter, demand-side factors such as SES have been 
known as more explanatory of the disparities of educational achievement than supply-side 
factors. Of the supply-side factors, exceptions include teacher-related variables, which have 
more explanatory power than others (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2017).  
 Supply-side teachers’ factors, such as perceived stereotypes of a certain gender, if 
any, are therefore thought to be a heterogeneous bias on how they rate and evaluate students 
of each gender differently. Let us confirm the possibility in which the rated educational 
performances of students can be influenced differently based on their gender even if they are 
in the same school environment. Then, teacher-perceived stereotypes can also be classified 
as a sequence of the determinants of academic performance disparities. 
 
A. On Supply-side Attributes as a Source of Disparities in Education 
 It has been called into question what the source of disparities in access to education 
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and educational outcomes across individuals is, not only limited to gender disparities but 
also in general. A dichotomy between demand and supply sides of education is a primary 
and straightforward framework. On one hand, it was believed that the school attributes as 
supply-side factors served as a key predictor of educational outcomes of students. 
Heyneman and Loxley (1983) argued that in developing countries, school- and teacher-
related variables accounted for a greater proportion of variance of student achievements than 
demand-side (individual- and household-level) SES did. It was called the “HL effect” 
(Huang, 2010). This was offset by the so-called Coleman Report, which reported low 
explanation powers of school-resource attributes for educational outcomes of students in the 
United States (Coleman et al., 1966). Relationships between demand- and school-side factors 
on educational outcomes have then been a big issue in related fields (Baker et al., 2002; 
Bouhlila, 2015; White, 1982).4 
 Nonetheless, later literature seems to converge toward denial of the HL effect.5 It 
admits the demand-side SES in developing countries accounts for much more than the 
supply-side variables6 (Hanushek, 2006; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2017). The pros and 
cons of the HL effect have still been a central question in the fields of education and 
development because the supply-side variations are the (possibly only) policy variables on 
which governments can intervene directly by arranging educational improvement through 
public policies.7 A more recent study by Hanushek and Woessmann (2017) surveyed the 
                                                        
4 Some scholars do not sufficiently emphasize the supply side factors but place considerable 
importance in demand side factors. There emerged a controversy regarding Heyneman (1989) 
and Riddell (1989a and 1989b) in a developing country setting. 
5 For example, Baker et al. (2002) conducted a comparative analysis of over 29 developing and 
developed countries using the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study [TIMSS] ; 
Riddell (1997) for cases of Botswana, Brazil, Columbia, Egypt, Honduras, India, Jordan, Namibia, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Zimbabwe; Huang (2010) for the Philippines; Bouhlila 
(2015) confirming Baker et al. (2002) for the TIMSS case in the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries. Meta-analysis covering 96 studies on the school-side effects on educational 
outcome found inconsistency in the explanation powers of the school-side variables in 
developing countries (Hanushek, 2006). 
6  Regarding the background of a weakened and vanishing HL effect, Baker et al. (2002) 
interpreted that “[i]nvestment in mass schooling by nation-states and multilateral agencies, 
backed by an ideology of providing some minimum level of school quality throughout the nation, 
has shifted the potential toward greater direct family SES effects in the social stratification 
process,” “[t]he macroprocess of mass schooling across a large part of the world may have 
achieved a resource threshold in the quality of schooling,” and “[t]his is one very plausible 
explanation for a shifting HL effect over time” (Baker et al. 2002: 310). 
7 I do not mean that demand-side–centered interventions of governments to livelihoods of poor 
students and families, e.g., school subsidy programs, are not a policy option to contribute to 
educational improvement. Here, it must be noted that the betterments of access to education and 
of quality of education differ from each other. 
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later literature and confirmed the same trends that the surveyed studies found regarding 
little significant explanatory power of the supply-side attributes, with exceptions such as the 
attributes of school teachers. 
 In the literature, variations of school-side factors have been gauged as overall effects 
that are homogeneous for male and female students. Yet, the supply-side factors can be 
transvalued if introducing the perspective of heterogeneity of the ways in which supply-side 
factors influence different groups of students. In the context of the current study, the 
interactions of gender-based stereotypes are thought to be one of such typical heterogeneous 
examples. 
 
B. Teachers’ Stereotypes or Bias that Teachers Have toward Some Students 
 School teachers are almost always near their students. As confirmed in Subsection 
A of this section, teachers’ variations are said to be an exceptionally stronger predictor than 
other school-related inputs (Hanusheck and Woessmann, 2017). At the same time, teachers 
are also occasionally reported to perpetrate stereotyping, which in turn affects students’ 
educational outcomes (Lavy, 2008; Torres, 2011; UNGEI, 2012). Emerging literature by Lavy 
(2008) and its successors, such as Cornwell et al. (2013) and Lavy and Sand (2018), opened a 
new approach to empirically study the effect of teachers as a source of stereotypes perceived 
against some students. Teachers had already been thought by educational psychology to be 
the source of unfavorable stereotypes of female students in particular school subjects such 
as math (Dusek and Joseph, 1983; Riegle-Crumb and Humphries, 2012; Tiedemann, 2000; 
Tiedemann, 2002). 
 Lavy (2008) deals with an Israeli case and Cornwell et al. (2013) with a US case and 
find such teachers’ stereotypes treat male students more unfavorably than females. In turn, 
Lavy and Sand (2018) studied the same Israeli case by more directly focusing on the 
consequences of such stereotypes on female students’ progress in the advanced science track 
in senior high schools and find that there are unfavorable stereotypes for female progress to 
the advanced tracks. Unfavorable female stereotypes are also found consistently in a French 
case (Terrier, 2015) and an Italian case (Carlana, 2017). As every study states, the direction 
toward females is strongly observed on the science track since it has been believed that math 
and sciences are male-dominated subjects in general (OECD, 2014).  
 Yet, these studies tested cases mostly in developed countries. 8  In developing 
                                                        
8 The term “developed countries” is gauged here as OECD member countries. Israel is one. Based 
on the literature survey by Lavy and Sand (2018), the applications of the initial study by Lavy 
(2008) range from teachers’ gendered stereotypes to racial discriminations in UK high schools 
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countries, there are few studies of the case. Data accessibility is possibly one of biggest 
obstacles because the documentation storage methods of schools and central governments 
differ greatly from those of developed countries. It can also fall afoul of privacy issues. 
However, given that the Philippines is one emerging country where boys’ 
underperformance is prevailing, it is highly relevant to study this by applying the 
aforementioned research framework to the country. 
 
C. Philippine Settings 
 A desk review by Torres (2011) lists concerns regarding Filipino boys’ 
underperformance in education: higher dropout rates; earlier linkage to economic activities; 
lower functional literacy rates; and lower scores across subjects and on NATs. She also 
mentions that Filipino boys are prone to be victims of corporal punishment. Some mode like 
hidden curriculum in classrooms can also unconsciously be exercised in an explicit curriculum 
but can be perceived to be a certain mode of messages by learners like prejudicial.  
 According to the UNGEI (2012), teachers are described as a stereotyping factor. 
Torres (2011) warns that the school environment nature is not gender-neutral in the 
Philippines and stereotypes impede boys’ potential and achievement in education. She adds 
that the teachers’ perceived stereotypes in a school environment are often perpetuated by 
inadequate male role models and guidance process (e.g., due to lack of male teachers). 
However, what has been lacking is data, particularly data disaggregated by gender, regional 
and geographical locations, socioeconomic background, and ethnicity. Without this data, the 
existence of stereotypes and bias embedded in learning environment remains hardly tested. 
 It is then good to question whether the stereotypes are a source of the Filipino boys’ 
persisting underperformance in education. In the HL effect literature, the country was not 
included in the developing countries that Heyneman and Loxley (1983) studied. Later, 
Riddell (1997) included the Philippines in her case studies and showed that the HL effect 
was not confirmed in the Philippine case along with cases of Botswana, Brazil, Columbia, 
Egypt, Honduras, India, Jordan, Namibia, Pakistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Huang (2010) 
also denied the HL effect by employing the household survey that was conducted by the 
government in Cebu, Philippines, through closed analysis to Riddell (1989a). Yet, as said by 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2017), teachers are one exceptional variable in testing the HL 
effect.  
 
                                                        
(Burgess and Greaves, 2013), discriminatory influences on black students in Brazilian schools 
(Botelho et al.,2015), and foreign students in Swedish high schools (Björn et al. (2011)  
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D. Reinforcements by Local Representations through Field Observations 
 Our observations in the fields also confirm that some male youths can be 
stereotyped by adults including teachers (see also a Western Visayas case in Okabe, 2018). 
For example, the inclination of male youths to be lazy was often raised by local adults as a 
primary reason why they think male youths tend to lag behind their female counterparts in 
education. More surprisingly, not few mothers that we encountered in our current study 
area in Marinduque boldly stated that their sons had low IQs (intelligence quotients): 
 
––“Oo naman, tamad nga kasi ang mga lalaki namen.” (Yeah certainly, because our boys 
are lazy.) 
––“Mababa din kasi ang IQ nila.” (In addition, because their IQ is low.) 
 
 According to them, however, the sons’ IQs had not ever been actually measured. 
Our interviewees, public school teachers, added that male students were much more out of 
their control in classes. They described that some male students came to be much more 
violent as they grew. 
 By combining the above related perspectives from the literature and some local 
representations and observations, this study aims to fill the literature gap by working on the 
question on the gender-heterogenetic stereotypes from school teachers, which has not been 
satisfactorily addressed so far. The local representations provided an eloquently reinforced 
hypothesis that the adults’ perceptions can sometimes be a negative bias against youths.  
  The structure of the paper is as follows: Section III provides the data, explaining the 
choice and characteristics of research site, the sampling technique, and the collected 
information. Section IV explains our analytical framework and empirical analysis. Section V 
shows the research results, by beginning with the benchmark results then reaching some 
additional analyses for robustness checks. Finally, Section VI spells out the conclusion and 
limitations for future study. Appendices I and II provide some supplementary information 
for the readers’ references. 
 
 
III. DATA 
 
A. Research Site and Sampling 
The data employed in the current study comes from our tailor-made questionnaire-
based household survey. The data collection was prepared from August 2017, and then the 
household survey was intensively conducted from January to March in 2018. Approximately 
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150 households with information of around 300 children were covered from nine barangays 
(the local government unit in the Philippines) in three municipalities, say, Boac, Gasan, and 
Buenavista, in the Province of Marinduque (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). The municipalities, 
barangays, and households were randomly chosen through the stratified random sampling 
technique based on the master list from the Community-based Monitoring System (CBMS) that 
the local government units provided.9 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of Marinduque Province on the National Map 
 
Source: Adapted from http://www.freemap.jp 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9  In August 2017, the author paid courtesy calls to every municipality hall to see 
mayors/representative of three municipalities. In this occasion, the barangay lists were collected 
from the municipalities. The collection of CBMS information at a barangay level was also helped 
by the author’s local counterparts. 
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Figure 2: Provincial Map of Marinduque 
 
Notes: The circles A–I represent the nine sampled barangays.  
Source: Hand-drawn by the author. 
 
 
Marinduque Province belongs to the Region IV-B (MIMAROPA). Because Filipino 
male youths start to lag behind females typically in secondary-level education, one of the 
regions with the largest gender gap in access to secondary-level education was first chosen. 
It is the Region IV-B, called MIMAROPA Region (Fig. 3). According to Fig. 3, male youths 
lag behind their female counterparts more in rural regions outside of Luzon Island than 
regions on Luzon Island. The regions in MIMAROPA, Visayas, and Mindanao are opposition 
to Metro Manila and Central Luzon where boys’ underperformance is much less severe. 
Region IV-B, MIMAROPA, used to be referred to as the Southern Tagalog Region. 
Marinduque Province is considered the geographical center of the Philippine archipelago; it 
is a heart-shaped island with a total land area of 952.58 square kilometers (Gaddi, 2018). The 
municipality Gasan is where purok Quatis in the barangay Masiga (the circle D in the Fig. 2) 
can be found.10 The purok Quatis has been the author’s research stronghold, whereby our 
preparatory fieldworks and observations and data collection works, including dry runs of 
questionnaire survey, have been spread to the other sites in order. There are no major cities 
                                                        
10 A purok is a Filipino term meaning a district within a barangay. 
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in Marinduque Province, which is comprised of only municipalities. Most of our study 
barangays are remote from poblacion, referring to central and commercial zones, in each 
municipality. Out of nine barangays, two barangays are classified as poblacion in two 
municipalities.  
 
 
Figure 3: Gender Disparities in Net Enrollment Rates at the Secondary Level 
 
Note: “(Female–Male)/Enrl(Male & Female)” means the proportion of differences of female-to-
male enrollment rates over the total enrollment rates. “Enrl(Male & Female)” means the 
total enrollment rates of both males and females. 
Source: FLEMSS 2013, PSA. 
 
 
Marinduque’s regional economy depends on primary industries such as agriculture 
(mainly palay [paddy rice] and coconut), horticulture (vegetables), and fishery. It also 
depends on craftworks and micro-business. The province’s economy is outstanding in the 
regional and national contexts in terms of the dominance of self-employment (Table 1). 
According to Table 1, the occupational rate of self-employment is dominant, reaching 45.80% 
in Marinduque Province compared to 37.42% in the MIMAROPA Region and 32.94% on 
average nationally in rural areas. The province’s high self-employment rate comes at the 
expense of the rate of private establishment, which is much lower in the province at 26.72% 
than the regional and national rural averages of 34.24% and 38.11%, respectively. These 
imply that the private firm-driven sectors are, by and large, yet far from developing in the 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Country’s Average
Metro Manila (NCR)
Illocos Region
Cordillera Administrative Region
Cagayan Valley Region
Central Luzon Region
CALABARZON Region
MIMAROPA Region
Bicol Region
Western Visayas Region
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Zamboanga Peninsula Region
Northern Mindanao Region
Davao Region
SOCSARGEN Region
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Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(Female -Male) / Enrl (Male & Female) Enrl (Male & Female)
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province. In exchange of its underdeveloped private sector, the governmental (public) sector 
absorbs more workers than regional and national rural average.11 
 
 
Table 1: Industrial Characteristics of Marinduque Province in Regional and National 
Contexts (%, 2015) 
Occupation Categories 
National 
Region Province 
Urban Rural 
Private household 6.66 4.38 4.43 4.58 
Private establishment 53.30 38.11 34.24 26.72 
Governmental corporation 9.38 8.62 9.62 12.21 
Self-employed 23.08 32.94 37.42 45.80 
Employer 2.64 4.73 4.31 1.53 
With pay (family-owned business) 0.43 0.29 0.46 0.00 
Without pay (family-owned business) 4.51 10.94 9.53 9.16 
Number of observations (persons) 28,814 49,734 2,392 262 
Note: Region = MIMAROPA region (Region IV-B); Province = Marinduque province. 
Source: LFS 2015, PSA. 
 
 
B. Collected Information 
 Our intensive survey collected information in the three categories: (1) individual 
characteristics of the sampled children who are mainly teenaged/in high school, (2) schooling 
and education profiles of the children, (3) basic information about their families, and (4) time-
allocation patterns of two selected children per household. (1), (2), and (4) were directly 
asked to the children (siblings), whereas (3) was asked to one of their parents or grandparents 
(adult guardians). In a few cases where the guardians were not available at the timing of our 
household survey, relatives (uncles/aunts or grandparents) responded on their behalf. A 
detailed summary of variables in the empirical analyses is presented in Appendix I.  
 The first category, children’s characteristics, is a set of data that includes names, sex, 
birthday, birth order, and number of siblings. The second category is regarding enrollment 
status and school-related information if enrolled or reasons for quitting schooling if not 
                                                        
11 In this sense, Marinduque Province is similar to Bukidnon Province (which Chapters 2 and 3 
discuss) in terms of the nature of underdevelopment of private sectors within the provincial 
economy and in the correspondingly substituting role by the public sector. 
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enrolled. For the third category on basic family information, we collected the demographic, 
educational, working, and earning information of parents, including the home addresses. 
These deserve control variables and are reported in summary statistics in Appendix I. 
 The fourth category, a time-allocation survey, is a collection of the allocations of (1) 
home time and (2) working time, based on classifications of Lam and McHale (2015). It 
collected daily information for a week (7 days) to attempt to mitigate time-variant incidents 
and then collect information based on their usual (average) patterns of activities.12 The home 
time includes sleep/rest and leisure activities such as playing. The children’s working time 
in a day includes studying at home and laboring for family members (e.g., helping with 
parents’ work and household chores). Combining the classifications of activities by Lam and 
McHale (2015) in our own preliminary observations as to how the children spend their time 
every day, the questionnaire of daily activities (like a diary) was semi-structured, meaning 
that most of the questionnaire was structured while leaving an unstructured (free-style) part. 
 In the structured part, the children were asked how much time (in minutes) they 
spent on the following activities: sleeping, schooling, helping their father and mother with 
their respective work, household chores, studying at home, playing outside/with friends, 
and going to a computer game shop. They were also asked the number of times they attended 
schooling in a week (namely, number of absences). In the unstructured part, we asked what 
other activities they did and for how long, if at all (free description).13 The questionnaires 
were self-administered. After collecting the filled questionnaires in 7 days, the author 
checked if there were unclear parts to modify. If critical contradictions and/or completely 
unclear answers were found, we did not allow the survey to be completed and asked the 
                                                        
12 Each set of questionnaire consists of seven sheets, from the first to the seventh day. Although 
the start date of the first day is not shared across individuals, the date of the first day was recorded 
in the questionnaire sheet to control for timing variations as well as to identify whether it was a 
working day or weekend/holidays and to note the day of week (e.g., Sunday, Monday, etc.). 
13 As unstructured parts of activities, children could also report their extra activities such as 
magsimba (going to church to attend a Christian Mass particularly on Sundays) and out-of-school 
practices (e.g., group dance practices) and/or irregular events (e.g., funeral, marriage parties), if 
any. However, this information is not actually used for our quantitative analysis, because their 
answers seem to suffer from selection problem (a distinct difference between children who are 
providing detailed information and children who do not provide any information on these extra 
activities) and because interpretations of this information are difficult, both coming from the 
truncated response frequencies. The author checked and moved to the structured part if some of 
the activities reported in the free descriptions were indicated in structured parts. Nonetheless, 
there seems to have still remained an issue of selection. We lack judgment as to whether some 
children kept some activities reported and others unreported, but they actually did. Yet, the 
contents were very helpful to know and learn how and for what the youths in our sample spent 
their time qualitatively. 
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child to refill with the correct information. If minor errors were found, the author would 
manually check and correct these by contacting the children and conduct follow-up 
confirmations by additional contacts. The mean comparisons tell us that there are clearly 
gendered patterns in the time-allocation patterns (see Section D in Appendix I for details). 
 
C. Information of Test Scores 
 The test scores of students were collected via the following two channels: direct 
interviews and administrative data provided by the government. The sample children were 
asked their latest scores on the teacher-based report card (hereafter, scores on RC) regarding 
seven school subjects: national language (Filipino), math, English, science, social studies14, 
MAPEH (music, arts, physical education, and health), and TLE (technology and livelihood 
education). When asking about the RC scores, we carefully explained to each child using 
both an oral and written explanation that the collected information would be immediately 
encoded into numerical and anonymous data which would keep individuals unidentifiable, 
and their proper names would never appear in the analyses and results. This dedicated 
explanation let the respondents feel at ease to answer the questions and thus achieve high 
rates of response regarding RC scores (see Fig. 4). 
  
 
Figure 4: Response Rates of RC Scores (by subjects) and Tracking Rate of NATs Scores 
 
Note: The rate of scores on NATs is based on the number of students who are in 
Grade 7 or above. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
 
 In turn, the score information of NATs was provided as the administrative data by 
                                                        
14 It is locally called HeKaSi or Araling Panlipunan. The former initials the Heograpiya, Kasaysayan 
at Sibika, meaning Geography, History, and Civics, and the latter means the social studies (aralin 
means study, -(n)g serves as a linker connecting with another word, and panlipunan means social). 
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the national government (DepED) with respect to the same children in our sample who are 
in or above the seventh grade (students lower than grade 6 do not yet have their own NAT 
scores). The office in charge is the BEA in the DepED, and we made a formal request to the 
office for the NAT data. The BEA-DepED took a considerably long time to try tracing the 
sample students listed in the request before finally providing us with the NAT score data of 
55% of the children from our sample children. The NAT is the Nationwide Achievement Test 
supervised by the DepED comprising five subjects: Filipino, English, math, science, and 
social studies (HeKaSi or Araling Panlipunan).  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of z Scores on RC and NATs 
Non-blind score (RC)
Filipino 275 0.34 -0.38 0.72
Math 274 0.26 -0.30 0.56
English 274 0.40 -0.47 0.87
Science 270 0.33 -0.39 0.72
Social Studies 259 0.34 -0.38 0.72
MAPEH 269 0.32 -0.38 0.71
TLE 240 0.28 -0.35 0.63
Blind score (NAT)
Filipino 135 0.00 0.00 0.00
Math 135 -0.01 0.02 -0.03
English 135 0.04 -0.06 0.10
Science 135 0.04 -0.07 0.11
Social Studies 135 0.06 -0.10 0.16
Scores and Subjects Δ(F - M)Obs Female (F) Male (M)
 
Notes: MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health; TLE = Technology and Livelihood 
 Education. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
 
 Both RC and NAT scores are standardized into z scores: 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖���) 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖⁄ , where 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 means the individual percentage scores of child 𝑖𝑖, the 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖��� is the mean score of the subject 
set 𝑆𝑆, and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 means the standard deviations of the subject set 𝑆𝑆. The raw scores on RC are 
rated as if they had the nonzero minimum score because they range mostly from 75 to 100, 
unlike the raw percentage scores on NATs that can range from 0 to 100, due to the education 
system of the Philippines. Scores on RC contain information through which teachers provide 
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evaluation, that is, “fail,” if under 75 or “pass,” if above 75. Those students who performed 
really poorly enough to be judged as “failure” (a factor to repetition) would get scores on RC 
lower than 75 (but this proportion is actually low). The standardization into z scores is useful 
in this sense that it will be more comparable across the scores from different tests and exams. 
Theoretically, the mean values of z scores take zero. The difference from zero is interpreted 
as a size of standard deviation (SD). 
 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of z scores on NATs and on RC by school 
subject. Obviously, male students receive lower scores on RC (non-blind scores) across all 
subjects. The gaps between male and female averages range from 0.56 SD for math to 0.87 
SD for English. This means that even in math, which is generally assumed to be a subject that 
male students perform better at, male students are underperforming compared to their 
female counterparts.  
 Intriguingly, the scores on NATs show much smaller gender gaps in contrast to the 
RC scores. The gaps are largest in social studies with a 0.16 SD size and smallest (not 
detected) in Filipino with a 0.00 SD size. In math, the female students received slightly lower 
scores on average than their male counterparts. The mean comparisons deliver two key 
points: The gender gap is much more prominent on the non-blind scores than on the blind 
scores, and the subject-base variations are also large depending on the subject.  
 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
A. Analytical Framework 
The rating system of NATs is conducted blindly and is done mechanically on the 
basis of numbers of questions correctly answered by external markers who do not know 
about the examinees. In contrast, the scores on RC are rated in a non-blind way by school 
teachers, who know about the evaluated (i.e., their students). The classification into “blind” 
and “non-blind” rating systems refers to what Lavy (2008) did. Applying the framework of 
Lavy (2008), who focused on the blind and non-blind rating settings of matriculation exams 
in Israeli public high schools, we hypothesize that the bias and perceptions of teachers 
toward some of their students, if any, will influence the rating of RC scores (non-blind scores) 
compared to NAT scores (blind scores). We also hypothesize that such stereotyping can be 
exercised even unconsciously and unintentionally by teachers. Lavy (2008) empirically 
regards the situation of having both blind and non-blind rating manners as a natural 
experimental setting where only the blindness in the evaluations changes and the blindness 
in the rating system is not a choice variable (i.e., examinees cannot choose or change the 
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blindness setting endogenously).  
As expected, the mean comparisons shown in Table 2 exhibit larger gender gaps on 
RC scores but much smaller or insignificant gender gaps on NAT scores in the same school 
subject sets (Subsection C in Section III). Our research aims to examine the channel through 
which the boys’ persisting underperformance in education can be explained by their 
evaluators, namely, their school teachers.  
 
B. Sensitivity Analysis in Benchmark Models 
 To test the bias and stereotype, we rely on the regression analysis, not merely on 
two-dimensional comparisons of mean values and descriptive statistics, because the effect of 
being male should be interpreted as a marginal effect or partial derivative, where other 
possible variables are controlled at constant (ceteris paribus).  
 In particular, we explore the sensitivity analysis by which we check the extent to 
which the effect of variable of interest is sensitive or stable through various specifications as 
other explanatory variables are included. This approach is relevant to a proposed method in 
recent works by Oster (2017) or in the original works by Altonji et al. (2005) and Bellows and 
Miguel (2009). Oster (2017) propounds exploring the sensitivity of coefficient stability when 
and after other controls are additionally included in regression equations and the transitive 
changes in R2, to examine the robustness of treatment effect in order to cope with the 
situation in which the observed variables do not fully capture the omitted unobserved 
characteristics. The discussions in Section II require incorporation of the SES variables as 
explanatory variables before supply-side factors. Therefore, by transitive changes from a 
very simple model to complex models where more SES-related covariates are controlled, our 
focus is on the persistence of the gender variable.  
 The econometric models are built as follows. To begin with, the simplest model is 
given by: 
 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (1) 
 
where the dependent variables 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the standardized z scores of the student 𝑖𝑖, on the 
test type 𝑗𝑗 = {NATs, RC}, and the set of school subject areas 𝑠𝑠 = {Filipino, math, English, 
science, social studies, MAPEH, TLE}; 𝛼𝛼0 is the intercept; 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is the male indicator taking 1 
if the individual 𝑖𝑖 is male and 0 otherwise. In Eq. (1), no covariates are controlled. 15 Table 
3 shows the results. This simple regression reconfirms the results in Table 2. 
                                                        
15 On the NATs, MAPEH and TLE are not examined. 
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Table 3: Single Regression of Male Effect on Scores by Test Type and Subject 
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu. MAPEH TLE
Scores on NATs:
Male (=1) 0.12 0.34** 0.16 0.07 0.12 n.a. n.a.
[0.18] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15] [0.14] n.a. n.a.
Adj. R2 0.08 0.41 0.35 0.36 0.37 n.a. n.a.
No. of Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 n.a. n.a.
Scores on RC:
Male (=1) -0.72*** -0.56*** -0.87*** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.71*** -0.63***
[0.11] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
Adj. R2 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10
No. of Obs. 275 274 274 270 259 269 240  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = Social Studies; MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health; TLE = 
 Technology and Livelihood Education.. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
 Then, we need to put the vector 𝐗𝐗  containing individual characteristics and 
household-level SES. Appendix Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the dependent 
and independent variables, and Appendix I describes the variables that are used as covariates. 
Whereas these variables are gradually added as covariates into the regression models by 
specifications, the main part of this paper shall omit reporting the coefficients of the other 
covariates in the tables for the sake of space and visuality. The full report corresponding to 
the full model is available in Appendix II. 
  Next, we put some fixed effects in the models to further control for some 
unobservable factors: 𝜌𝜌 denotes the school year (SY) effect capturing difficulty levels of 
NATs in each SY that can vary in some SYs; 𝜔𝜔 denotes the region-specific effect to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity across the barangays; and 𝜑𝜑 denotes the school effect to 
control for unobservable heterogeneity in attributes of teachers and schools. Particularly, 𝜑𝜑 
is decomposed into the overall part, 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, and the male-specific part, 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀 (i.e., 𝜑𝜑 = 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +
𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀). The model is now rewritten as: 
 
 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝐗𝐗𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝛃𝛃𝐢𝐢𝐣𝐣 + 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. (2) 
 
The idea of exploring sensitivity is like this: Expected signs of 𝛿𝛿s are negative, but 
when 𝛿𝛿s are negative, the extent of the persistence of 𝛿𝛿 is of our interest. If the individual 
characteristics and household-level SES already capture sufficiently the influences of being 
male, then the insignificant relation 𝛿𝛿 = 0 can no longer be rejected. If the added covariates 
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do not yet capture them, 𝛿𝛿 is still expected to be statistically significant and negative. In turn, 
if the sources of male effect mainly include regional heterogeneity, 𝛿𝛿  will be 
indistinguishable from taking zero once the region-specific effects are controlled for. 
Likewise, if the teachers’ in-school factors play highly as the source of male effect, here 𝛿𝛿 
will be indistinguishable from taking zero once those school effects are controlled for. In sum, 
sensitive analysis allows to check the persistence of the male effect as other covariates and 
fixed effects are added in the specifications. 
 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
A. Benchmark Results 
1. Male effect when other individual and household characteristics are controlled  
 To begin, Table 4 shows the result of regression analysis when individual and 
household characteristics are controlled as covariates. The male effects do not qualitatively 
change from the result of single regression in Table 3. The male effect is not detected on the 
scores on NATs, except for math where the male effect is positive, but it is robustly persistent 
on the scores on RC through all the subjects. Whereas male students perform well in math 
relative to their female counterparts on the blind scores, they underperform on the non-blind 
scores across all subjects including math, MAPEH, and TLE. 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Sensitivity Analysis (Covariates = Individual/household characteristics)  
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu. MAPEH TLE
Scores on NATs:
Male (=1) 0.00 0.29* 0.05 0.02 0.08 n.a. n.a.
[0.19] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] n.a. n.a.
Adj. R2 0.23 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.47 n.a. n.a.
No. of Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 n.a. n.a.
Scores on RC:
Male (=1) -0.69*** -0.66*** -0.86*** -0.85*** -0.59*** -0.62*** -0.68***
[0.17] [0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.18] [0.16] [0.17]
Adj. R2 0.23 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.32 0.31
No. of Obs. 256 255 255 251 241 250 221  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = Social Studies; MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health; TLE = 
 Technology and Livelihood Education.. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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2. Male effect when the region effect is additionally controlled  
 Estimations in the results of Table 5 further add the barangay-level region effect to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across the living places. The adjusted R2 increases in 
all the subjects in Table 4, and so the regional heterogeneity has some explanation power on 
the scores. Yet, the patterns of marginal effect of being male on both scores remain persistent 
and are qualitatively the same as in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 5: Results of Sensitivity Analysis (Covariates = Individual and household 
characteristics + Region effect)  
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu. MAPEH TLE
Scores on NATs:
Male (=1) 0.00 0.29* 0.05 0.02 0.08 n.a. n.a.
[0.19] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] n.a. n.a.
Adj. R2 0.21 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.45 n.a. n.a.
No. of Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 n.a. n.a.
Scores on RC:
Male (=1) -0.77*** -0.61*** -0.94*** -0.83*** -0.63*** -0.74*** -0.64***
[0.15] [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.15] [0.14] [0.15]
Adj. R2 0.25 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.31 0.30
No. of Obs. 256 255 255 251 241 250 221  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = Social Studies; MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health; TLE = 
Technology and Livelihood Education.. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
3. Male effect when the school effect is additionally controlled  
 Next, estimations in the results of Table 6 further add the school effect to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity on school attributes. As compared to Table 5, the positive male 
effect on math on the blind scores turns out to be insignificant here. Yet, the male effect still 
remains persistently negative through all subjects on the non-blind scores. 
 
4. Male effect when male-specific part of school effect is isolated and additionally controlled 
 Furthermore, to isolate unobserved heterogeneity that can affect selectively on male 
students in schools, the male-specific part of school effect, 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀, is set apart and added in the 
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equation. The results are shown in Table 7. There are two noteworthy changes in Table 7. 
First, the male effect on NATs (blind scores) here becomes positive once again for math and 
positive recently for English and science (in the upper stage of Table 7). Second, the male 
effect is consistently negative so far, but vanishes on scores on RC regardless of the subject 
(in the lower stage of Table 7).  
 Initially, there was minor gender difference on the scores on NATs when comparing 
the mean values. This has remained even after other individual- and household-level 
characteristics, unobserved heterogeneities across living places and schools, and some school 
year-specific difficulty levels are controlled at constant. However, once 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀 is also controlled, 
the male effect becomes positive on math, English, and science in Table 7.  
 Table 7 shows that, if 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀, say, male-specific but directly unobserved environment 
for male students in schools, gets controlled at constant, being male alone would predict 
higher scores of math, English, and science on the NAT than their female counterparts. 
However, the estimation including 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀 indicated the “underestimation” of the male effect 
until the previous specifications without 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀 toward the direction to zero unless the former 
effect is controlled. Namely, some sort of within-school environment selectively to male 
students may be masking such potentiality of male students. In other words, the source of 
the considerable part of the negative male effect that has been persistently detected on the 
RC scores is in the schools. 
 
 
Table 6: Results of Sensitivity Analysis (Covariates = Individual and household 
characteristics + Region effect + School effect)  
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu. MAPEH TLE
Scores on NATs:
Male (=1) -0.18 0.16 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 n.a. n.a.
[0.20] [0.16] [0.17] [0.17] [0.15] n.a. n.a.
Adj. R2 0.29 0.57 0.53 0.49 0.51 n.a. n.a.
No. of Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 n.a. n.a.
Scores on RC:
Male (=1) -0.69*** -0.66*** -0.86*** -0.85*** -0.59*** -0.62*** -0.68***
[0.17] [0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.18] [0.16] [0.17]
Adj. R2 0.28 0.29 0.38 0.40 0.25 0.30 0.29
No. of Obs. 236 235 236 231 221 231 207  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = Social Studies; MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health; TLE = 
Technology and Livelihood Education.. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 7: Results of Sensitivity Analysis (Covariates = Individual and household 
characteristics + Region effect + School effect + Male-specific School effect)  
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu. MAPEH TLE
Scores on NATs:
Male (=1) 1.30 1.47*** 1.29* 1.23** 0.87 n.a. n.a.
[0.82] [0.55] [0.71] [0.49] [0.66] n.a. n.a.
Adj. R2 0.32 0.61 0.54 0.51 0.52 n.a. n.a.
No. of Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 n.a. n.a.
Scores on RC:
Male (=1) 1.15 0.02 1.08 1.03 -0.77 0.39 0.14
[0.83] [0.92] [0.75] [0.78] [0.90] [0.99] [1.00]
Adj. R2 0.24 0.26 0.37 0.41 0.22 0.27 0.25
No. of Obs. 236 235 236 231 221 231 207  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = Social Studies; MAPEH = Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health; TLE = 
Technology and Livelihood Education.. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
 Likewise, on the teacher-based scores on RC, being male alone would no longer 
predict a negative or a positive consequence when controls include 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀, regardless of the 
subject. Given the persistence of negative coefficients of being male until the previous 
specifications without 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀, the male effect alone, until the previous specification, has been 
“underestimated” toward a downward direction from zero to negative. Eventually, the 
results in Table 7 consistently explain that the male-specific part of school effect represents a 
considerable part of the 𝛿𝛿s, say, male effect that was estimated to be persistently negative 
until the last specification. This finding further supports that the male students are selectively 
facing some sort of unfavorable bias in schools. 
 
B. The Same-student Comparisons by Subtracting Blind and Non-blind Scores 
 The benchmark analyses in the previous subsection yield the results that the male 
students are significantly underperforming in the non-blind scores but are not doing so in 
the blind scores with various specifications to put additional controls. The results come from 
the separate estimations of the scores on NATs and on RC, respectively. Whereas the separate 
estimations indicate the features of each score, it is more straightforward to directly look at 
the differences between the two score of the same individuals. To do so, by taking advantage 
of statistical properties of standardized z scores, we subtract the scores on RC from the scores 
on NATs to get the differences and directly use the variable for regression analysis. This 
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subsection further explores the robustness checks of additional possible arrangements to test 
whether the obtained results drastically change qualitatively. The model rewrites: 
 
 Δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖′𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝐗𝐗𝛃𝛃𝐣𝐣′ + 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ . (3) 
 
where Δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖. Each coefficient means: 
 
 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖′ = 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 and 𝛃𝛃𝐣𝐣′ = 𝛃𝛃𝐑𝐑𝐑𝐑,𝐣𝐣 − 𝛃𝛃𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍𝐍,𝐣𝐣, (4) 
 
where we are continuously interested in the significance and signs of 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖′ . If 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖′ ⋚ 0, then 
𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖 ⋚ 𝛿𝛿𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖. 
 Table 8 summarizes the descriptive statistics of Δ𝑆𝑆, and the distributions of Δ𝑆𝑆 by 
school subjects are drawn in Fig. 5 for the visual information. The differences can only be 
calculated on the subsample whose scores on NATs were tracked. If Δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 0, it means that 
the individual 𝑖𝑖 takes higher z score on RC on the subject 𝑆𝑆 than that on NATs, and if 
Δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 0, it means vice versa. This Table 8 still shows that Δ𝑆𝑆 of female individuals are 
higher than Δ𝑆𝑆 of males across all five subjects.16 It should be noted here that the properties 
of Δ𝑆𝑆 are not totally the same as z scores because Δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅,𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 , not necessarily 
guaranteeing that the means of Δ𝑆𝑆 become zero and SDs of Δ𝑆𝑆 become one. 
 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of the Differences between the Two Scores by Subject 
Δ Score (RD - NAT)
Filipino 125 0.35 -0.10 0.46
Math 123 0.30 -0.09 0.39
English 125 0.34 -0.12 0.46
Science 121 0.47 0.05 0.42
Social Studies 114 0.31 0.10 0.21
Scores and Subjects Δ(F - M)Obs Female (F) Male (M)
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
 
  Table 9 displays the results of estimating Δ𝑆𝑆  as dependent variables by 
specifications similar to the ones in the benchmark analyses: Specification (1) is the single 
                                                        
16 MAPEH and TLE are no longer available because these subjects are not examined in the NATs. 
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regression only with the male indicator, corresponding to Table 3. Specification (2) adds the 
individual and household characteristics as the covariates, corresponding to Table 4. 
Specification (3) further adds the region effect, corresponding to Table 5, and likewise, 
specification (4) additionally controls for the school effect, corresponding to Table 6. Finally, 
specification (5) adds the 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀, corresponding to Table 7. 
 
 
Figure 5: Distributions of Differences Between the Two Scores by Subject 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
 
 Results in Table 9 show that the male effect in specifications (1) and (2) are 
significantly negative except for social studies. In turn, in specifications (3) and (4), the signs 
of male effect estimated remain significantly negative for English and science. Then, in 
specification (5), it is noteworthy that the male effects are detected as negative across all the 
subjects, including social studies.  
 Based on the logic in interpreting the transitive change from Table 6 to Table 7, the 
results from the benchmark analysis are qualitatively confirmed also by more 
straightforward estimations using the differences between the two scores and are the case 
for English and science. In contrast to the benchmark analyses of separate estimations, such 
0
5
10
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-2 0 2 4
 RC - NAT (Filipino)
Δ Filipino
0
5
10
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-2 0 2 4
 RC - NAT (Math)
Δ Math
0
5
10
15
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-4 -2 0 2 4
 RC - NAT (English)
Δ English
0
5
10
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
 RC - NAT (Science)
Δ Science
0
2
4
6
8
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
 RC - NAT (Social Studies)
Δ Social Studies
Female Male
27 
 
unfavorable treatments against male students remain or become negative across all subjects 
even when 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀 is controlled for.  
 
 
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis of Differences between Scores on RC and on NAT by Subject 
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu.
(1) Covariates =  None
Male (=1) -0.47** -0.40* -0.51*** -0.45** -0.28
[0.20] [0.22] [0.19] [0.19] [0.20]
Adj. R2 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.14
No. of Obs. 125 123 125 121 114
(2) Covariates = Individual, Household SES
Male (=1) -0.52* -0.50* -0.89*** -0.66*** -0.46
[0.27] [0.29] [0.23] [0.24] [0.28]
Adj. R2 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.22
No. of Obs. 118 116 118 114 107
(3) Covariates = (2) + Region effect
Male (=1) -0.43 -0.46 -0.87*** -0.64** -0.42
[0.30] [0.33] [0.25] [0.25] [0.30]
Adj. R2 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.21
No. of Obs. 118 116 118 114 107
(4) Covariates = (3) + School effect
Male (=1) -0.29 -0.40 -0.81*** -0.79*** -0.44
[0.31] [0.37] [0.28] [0.26] [0.33]
Adj. R2 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.20
No. of Obs. 118 116 118 114 107
(5) Covariates = (4) + Male-specific School effect
Male (=1) -1.32* -3.23*** -1.41** -1.95*** -2.24***
[0.76] [0.70] [0.69] [0.57] [0.66]
Adj. R2 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.19
No. of Obs. 118 116 118 114 107
Specifications
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = Social Studies. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
 Unlike the separate estimations of blind scores and non-blind scores, the direct 
estimations of Δ𝑆𝑆 (or joint estimations of two scores by subtractions) now show that even 
an inclusion of 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀 does not sufficiently capture the male effect estimated to be negative. 
The two-score differences are assumed to more directly capture the effect brought by the 
score markers (teachers) who know who the evaluated are. In contrast to the results from the 
benchmark analyses, the results in Table 9 reinforce our hypothesis that male (female) 
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students are more likely to be treated relatively unfavorably (favorably) when students are 
rated in a non-blind rating system in which teachers know who the evaluated are.  
 
C. What More Do We Need to Consider? 
 So far, the benchmark analyses and direct estimations of two-score differences 
imply supportive results of our hypothesis. This subsection explores and examines the 
obtained results from some critical perspectives, to ascertain the arguments. Let us 
specifically discuss the selection bias, the students’ studiousness, and the teachers’ genders 
as alternative factors. 
 
 
Table 10: Probit Analysis (Probability of the tracking scores on NATs) 
Independent Variables Coef.
Male (=1) 1.21
[1.54]
Grade -0.08
[0.07]
Male×Grade -0.08
[0.10]
z score on RC, Filipino -0.07
[0.20]
Male×z score on RC, Filipino 0.01
[0.29]
z score on RC, math -0.14
[0.18]
Male×z score on RC, math -0.3
[0.29]
z score on RC, Englsih -0.48**
[0.24]
Male×z score on RC, English 0.89***
[0.34]
z score on RC, science 0.43*
[0.23]
Male×z score on RC, science -0.14
[0.35]
z score on RC, social studies 0.2
[0.21]
Male×z score on RC, social studies 0.06
[0.30]
Intercept 1.5
[1.12]
Regional effect Yes
Pseudo R 2 0.17
No. of Obs. 202
 
Note: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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1. Would the tracking of scores on NATs matter? 
 In directly estimating the two-score differences, the subsample whose Δ𝑆𝑆  are 
observed is used. This subsample is the one whose scores on NATs were tracked. As in 
Section III, the scores on NATs were tracked by the BEA-DepED at their best efforts in 
correspondence with the author’s data request. Admittedly, when tracking students, the 
BEA-DepED had neither any intention nor incentive to omit and exclude specific students. 
In this sense, the success or failure of tracking the students is out of our control and choice. 
Nevertheless, the ex post outcome implies that the gender gaps (ΔF − M) get smaller in the 
Table 8 than those in Table 2. Possible reasons may include the following: (1) the non-tracked 
students recently migrated to our study areas in Marinduque Province as the tracking was 
done based on the individual names and current home address, or (2) some students did not 
take the NATs.  
 For (1), it is least possible according to our field observations. Our sampling 
framework was based on the master list information on the CBMS conducted in 2015, and 
our own household survey was conducted in 2018. We found only four households that were 
not listed in the CBMS out of all the sample households. Moreover, out of those four 
households, only one household’s children’s NAT scores were not tracked by the BEA-
DepED. The migration profile is thus thought to be least associated with the tracking rates.  
 In turn, the possibility of (2) can be more considerable than (1). In principle, it is an 
obligation for every eligible student to take the NAT regardless if he/she is enrolled in a 
public or private school. In practice, however, some local teachers reported to the author that 
some students might not take the NAT because they were absent on the date of the 
examination. Teachers let the students take the NAT, but there is no explicit penalty even if 
a student did not take it.  
 Therefore, by probit analysis, the probability of the NAT scores being tracked is 
estimated. The male indicator is an independent variable. In addition, the score information 
on RC of the same school subject (Filipino, math, English, science, and social studies) is also 
used as independent variables to consider the possibility of associations with lower academic 
performances. Additionally, the interaction terms of male indicator with each score 
information on RC are also used in the independent variables.  
 Table 10 shows the results. They do not support that neither sex influences the 
probability of NAT scores being tracked, yet there is a gender-heterogenetic association in 
English performance. The scores on NATs of those male students better performing English 
are more likely to be tracked than the female students who perform similarly. For science 
performance, there is a gender-homogeneous association, as the scores on NATs of those 
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students performing better in science are more likely to be tracked regardless of gender.  
 In any case, given the estimated results, the probability of the NAT scores being 
tracked or untracked, even if it is a bias, would not do harm to the interpretations of the 
results in Table 9 because the probability only works for the negative male effects to be more 
weakly detected than in the counterfactual situation where NAT scores of all the students 
were tracked. If the potentiality had the opponent property, namely, if the scores on NATs 
of those better-performing students were less likely to be tracked, our results could be 
overestimated. However, our logical inference and the probit analysis do not support the 
opponent case, and so we can interpret the current results as existing at the very least. 
Counterfactually, the male effects in our results could have been more significant. Eventually, 
these reconfirm that the negative male effects in the counterfactual situation could have been 
statistically significant no less than our current results in Table 9 but that they could not have 
been weaker than our current results in the same table. 
 
2. Would the studiousness of students matter? 
 Aside from the potentiality of NAT score-related selection bias, there is another 
issue to be considered. Some may criticize that the NATs are the object-test-based 
examinations and the numbers of correct answers really matter, but in contrast, the scores 
on RC are calculated more holistically depending not only on the objective performance but 
also on the attitudinal factors of student learning. The author has two arguments against this 
possible criticism. 
 First, students’ attitude- and mentality-based “observed values,” such as maka-diyos 
(piety), makatao (humane personality), maka-kalikasan (friendliness to the environment and 
nature), and makabansa (nationalism and citizenship), are also evaluated on the RC separately 
from the subject learning performances. Even if attitudinal factors matter, the teachers are 
assumed to distinguishably rate the scores because academic performances and such value-
based attitudinal proactivity bases are evaluated separately.  
 Second, on the contrary, in their rating policy circulated to all the school teachers, 
the DepED certainly asks the teachers to rely not only on objective basis but also on others. 
DepED (2015) figures out three criteria to rate the scores on RC: (1) performance tasks, (2) 
written works, and (3) quarterly assessment. The quarterly assessment is to evaluate the 
achievement in the semester exams. The (1) and (2) would add routine attitudinal factors in 
student learning; attendance and the extent of accomplishing projects (a kind of homework) 
matter. Some would say that there can be a gender difference in the routine-based factors 
between male and female students before talking about the teacher-perceived stereotypes.  
 In case a student’s attitudinal factors cannot be captured by his/her RC parts in 
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maka-diyos, makatao, maka-kalikasan, and makabansa, the current study also tries an alternative 
way to control for such attitudinal factors as much as possible. Thus, our data collected the 
information of the weekly time-allocation patterns of children. As explained in Subsection B 
in Section III, we have information on children’s time allocation regarding time at home and 
time spent working plus the weekly frequency of going to schools. The pattern differences 
are additionally controlled just as additional covariates of proxies of their real attitudinal 
factors. 
 Table 11 shows the estimation of Δ𝑆𝑆 additionally with the information of time-
allocation patterns as covariates to specification (5) in Table 9. Even when such time-
allocation patterns are controlled for, the male effect on Δ𝑆𝑆 remains negative. These results 
reconfirm that the male students are still more likely to be treated unfavorably in the non-
blind scores even when time-allocation patterns as proxies of students’ studiousness are 
additionally controlled for. 
 
 
Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis of Differences between Scores on RC and on NAT by Subjects 
(Covariates = Specification (5) in the Table 9 + Time-allocation Patterns) 
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu.
Male (=1) -1.28 -3.27*** -1.84** -1.82** -1.86**
[0.90] [0.89] [0.85] [0.71] [0.76]
Adj. R2 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.26
No. of Obs. 117 115 117 113 106  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = Social Studies. Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes.  
 3. Information on the time-allocation patterns is added as covariates to the specification (5)   
 in Table 9. 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
3. Teachers’ Gender Matters? 
 When considering the teachers as a source of stereotyping, teachers’ attributes 
would matter. The teachers’ gender is a potentially key variable (Torres, 2011). Indeed, the 
labor market of school teachers in the Philippines is highly predominated by female teachers, 
said to count for 80% or 90%. Actually, the teacher gender ratios (TGRs) of the sample schools 
present the high predominance of female teachers regardless of school subject and education 
level.  
 Table 12 summarizes the TGRs of the sampled schools. Overall, 81.7% of school 
32 
 
teachers are females. At the elementary and secondary levels, 87.1% and 72.0% of teachers 
are females, respectively. This shows that majority of the school teachers are females, which 
is a feature quite unique to the Philippines. By school subjects, more female teachers teach 
the five NAT-covered subjects (Filipino, math, English, science, and social studies) than the 
two non-NAT subjects (MAPEH and TLE; 79.3% vs 57.4%). Compatibility between own-sex 
teachers and cross-sex teachers for a student can be a source of supply-side-originated 
stereotypes or bias. Therefore, in addition to the studiousness of students, the TGRs of the 
said school subject in the student’s school shall be used in the analyses as additional set of 
controlling variables. 
 
 
Table 12: Teachers’ Gender Ratios by School Levels and Subjects (Sample Schools) 
Male teachers 18.3%
Female teachers 81.7%
Male teachers 12.9%
Female teachers 87.1%
Male teachers 28.0%
Female teachers 72.0%
Male teachers 20.7%
Female teachers 79.3%
Male teachers 42.6%
Female teachers 57.4%
TGR
Elementary Level
Secondary Level
General 5 Subjects (Filipino, Math, English, Science, Social
Studies)
MAPEH + TLE
Overall
School Levels and Subjects
 
Source: DepED Basic Education Information System (BEIS). 
 
 
 Table 13 reports the estimation results with the TGRs of each school subject in the 
enrolled school as additional set of controlling variables to the covariates in specification (5) 
of Table 9. Comparing with Table 11, after the TGRs are controlled, the negative signs turn 
to be insignificant in Table 13, except for math. Combining the results of Table 9, Table 11, 
and Table 13, we can interpret as follows: The male effect is estimated to be negative in Table 
9, and Table 11 implies that the additional controlling variables such as the time-allocation 
patterns as proxies of students’ studiousness did not yet sufficiently represent the marginally 
lower scores on the two-score differences. However, the male effect which turns to be 
insignificant in Table 13 indicates that the teachers’ attribute such as their gender variations 
now considerably represents the marginally lower scores on the two-score differences. 
 If the male students were lazy, irresponsible in learning, and underperforming as 
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compared to their female counterparts determinately, inclusion of a teachers’ attribute, such 
as gender, would not matter in the sensitivity of the male effect on the two-score difference. 
Nonetheless, Table 13 presents that the persistent male effect vanishes when the own-subject 
teachers’ gender variations are controlled, and thus, the negative male effect on the two-score 
differences is interpreted to be highly represented by such a teacher-side attribute. 
Incorporating the empirical framework focusing on the difference between blind and non-
blind rating systems, it is thought to be most likely reasonable to interpret that the “boys’ 
underperformance” is augmented by the score markers, namely, teachers, through a mode 
of stereotyping or bias against male students. 
 
 
Table 13: Sensitivity Analysis, Difference Between Scores on RC and on NAT by Subject 
(Covariates = Specification (5) in Table 12 + TGRs of each school subject) 
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu.
Male (=1) 2.02 1.29 0.20 0.88 1.27
[1.69] [1.19] [1.36] [1.01] [1.18]
Adj. R2 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.37 0.30
No. of Obs. 115 113 115 111 104  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = social studies. Numbers in brackets are robust standard  errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for spaces and visual purposes. 
 Appendix Table 3 provides the full reports.   
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
 Furthermore, Table 14 supports the results from Table 13. Table 14 presents the 
results of estimating the model including interaction term of male indicator with the TGRs 
of each own school subject (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 for the own subject 𝑠𝑠), or in a math expression: 
 
 Δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖′′𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖� + 𝐗𝐗𝛃𝛃𝐣𝐣′′ + 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜔𝜔 + 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′′ . (5) 
 
The coefficients of male indicator shift to be statistically positive for math, science, and social 
studies (for Filipino and English, point estimates are positive but not statistically significant). 
The coefficients of interaction term for the same set of subjects are estimated to be negative. 
Yet, the overall effect of female TGRs is insignificant over all the subjects. These mean that 
being male would potentially predict positive effect on 𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆, but actually, as the female TGRs 
increase, male students selectively receive lower non-blind scores. However, even when the 
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female TGRs increase, it does not influence the female students. 
 
 
Table 14: Sensitivity Analysis, Difference between Scores on RC and on NAT by subject 
(Covariates = Specification (5) in Table 11 + Interaction term of male indicator with the 
TGRs of each own school subject) 
Filipino Math English Science Soc. Stu.
Male (=1) 13.04 68.25*** 5.66 44.59** 207.28**
[22.41] [20.92] [17.65] [17.53] [82.82]
Female TGR (own subject) -0.10 -7.85 -10.13 -24.06 -88.34
[15.18] [19.81] [14.16] [20.72] [113.39]
Male × Female TGR (own subject) -12.68 -94.32*** -5.94 -53.31** -239.54**
[24.27] [28.69] [20.23] [20.73] [95.54]
Adj. R2 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.37 0.30
No. of Obs. 115 113 115 111 104  
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: 1. Soc. Stu. = social studies. Numbers in brackets are robust standard  errors. 
 2. Coefficients of other covariates are omitted in this report for space and visual purposes. 
 Appendix Table 3 provides the full reports.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUION 
 
Section V provides various findings from sensitivity analysis to support the hypothesis that 
students of one gender are stereotyped when school teachers know who the evaluated are or 
when students are rated in a non-blind rating system. School teachers may, even 
unconsciously, believe some unfavorable stereotypes toward one of the genders (Torres, 
2011). Our identification strategy is similar to that of Lavy (2008). Our results of the 
benchmark analyses and the direct (joint) estimations of two-score differences among the 
same students support the statement that male students are more likely to systematically get 
evaluated lower than their female counterparts when teachers know who the evaluated are. 
Some further investigations regarding robustness by sensitivity analysis (Oster, 2017) also 
serve to confirm whether the results remain the same qualitatively as what was obtained 
previously. Particularly, the sensitivity explorations support our hypothesis because the 
persistently negative male effect vanishes when variations of teachers’ attributes are 
controlled for. The conclusions include the notion that the existing and persistent Filipino 
boys’ “underperformance in education” is augmented or amplified by evaluators who know 
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who the evaluated are.  
 More than a dozen explorations of sensitivities of male effect with respect to added 
controls done in this study quantitatively pin down the possible source(s) of persistent 
negative male effect. For example, according to the increasing adjusted R2, as more controls 
are added, some individual- and household-level characteristics are already significant 
predictors of academic achievement and disparities. What we need to recall, however, is the 
persistence of male effect staying negative even when they are added. The persistence has 
lasted until male-specific school effect and, more explicitly, the female TGR information are 
controlled. Considerable parts of the persistent negative male effect on the difference 
capturing the blind vs. non-blind rating system are therefore represented not by individual-, 
household-, or region-level variations but by school-side variations, particularly of teachers. 
Yet, it should be noted here that this paper does not intend to blame teachers who would 
stereotype in the end. It requires a more nuanced attitude to consider the background if such 
stereotype can even potentially, unconsciously, and unintentionally be exercised.  
 The findings are also relevant to the controversy in the literature on the HL effect. 
Whereas the previous literature tends to deny the HL effect, the current study obtains the 
results to reappraise the HL effect captured by school teachers that work heterogeneously 
over genders. This is consistent with the latest studies (Hanushek and Woesmann, 2017) that 
attach an exceptional status to teachers out of other school-resource variables in explaining 
disparities of academic performances among students. Needless to say, children and their 
parents face barriers and obstacles contingent with their SES–––demand-side factors. 
Situations of extreme poverty and instability, for instance, would require children to spend 
their time contributing to their households’ livelihood rather than stay in school. It has been 
widely documented that parents facing financial constraints stop sending their son(s) to 
school more frequently compared to their daughters because parents know that sons tend to 
receive lower evaluations from schools.  
 A social significance of being stereotyped was spelled out in the literature. For 
example, the risk of being stereotyped was warned by sociology and sociopsychology as 
“stereotype threat” (Steele and Aronson, 1995), with a study of relations between African 
Americans and their test performances. If the stereotype threat holds, the stereotype and the 
set of stereotyped behaviors will be in a recursive, recurrent relation: People are stereotyped 
by others because of their certain behaviors, and, in turn, people will behave in that way 
because of that very stereotype. 
 The “boys’ underperformance in education” is a puzzle in the setting of developing 
countries because poorer countries are generally more challenged by the issue of provision 
of girls’ education. Previous literature working on the Philippine case provided us with some 
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empirically sound perspectives to explain the backgrounds of the issue, including focuses on 
poverty as a driving force of boys’ immediate contributions to family livelihoods as labor 
forces rather than as student learning in schools, especially upon reaching physical maturity 
(Torres, 2011); on the comparative advantage between men and women with respect to 
agricultural occupations that are less profitable than jobs in non-agricultural sectors 
(Estudillo et al. 2008); on some parental egalitarian behaviors with respect to either inheriting 
lands to sons as a bequest or investing as its compensation in daughters’ human capital 
(Estudillo et al. 2001); willingness or “pro-girl” intra-household bias of parents in rural 
Philippines in treating their daughters more favorably than their sons (Fuwa, 2014); on 
pressure for female to more achieve human capital accumulation in a reflection of the 
pressures and wage penalties in Philippine labor markets toward women (Yamauchi and 
Tiongco, 2013); or on the boys’ laziness and irresponsibility to learning as if they are their 
inherent habitudes (Bouis et al. 1998), among others. These perspectives basically suggest 
demand-side interventions to achieve the more gender-equal educational achievement. 
However, this study, through a channel of school-side factors, suggests supply-side 
interventions regarding the same issue. For instance, the high female dominance of teacher 
labor markets in the Philippines is of interest. If the “chemistry” of female teachers with male 
students is one of the stated sources, informing female (and also male) teachers of the 
possible bias in evaluating male and female students can be one option we can begin with in 
addition to enriching demand-side focus on interventions. 
 Yet, the current study still does have some limitations to be addressed in the future. 
Firstly, the tracking rates of scores on NATs should have been higher. Indeed, it is generally 
strictly restricted for the government to provide individual-based score information. 
Additionally, in most cases, it must be an especially difficult task to match every individual 
between our own prepared list and the information in the government’s storage. Yet, tighter 
collaborations of academic researchers and the government before designing and planning 
researches could enable a broader coverage of matching information. Secondly, it is more 
desirable for more detailed information on teachers’ backgrounds to be collected so that the 
robustness of the obtained results can be further proven. Finally, explorations of additional 
possible factors on students to the routine-work-based evaluations on RC are a future 
challenge to be incorporated.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
This Appendix I provides the sample characteristics based on the summary statistics of the 
dependent and independent variables, based on our full model. Appendix Table 1 provides 
the summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables. 
 
A. Individual Characteristics 
 The male indicator variable shows that 48% of children in our sample are males (the 
remaining 52% are females). The birth-order information uses the indicators of being 
firstborn (panganay) and being last-born (bunso) children, and the numbers of younger 
siblings and of older siblings show that 17% and 22% of children are firstborn and last-born, 
respectively. Firstborn sons and last-born sons account for 7% and 10%, respectively. On 
average, a child has 1.76 younger siblings and 2.64 elder siblings, which imply that the 
average total number of siblings is around 5.4 (=1.76 (younger siblings) + 2.64 (elder siblings) 
+ 1.0 (oneself)). Among the siblings, the birth order of a child on average is thus around 
second to third. Out of the sample size, 48% of children have some sort of role model in their 
community whom he or she admires and wants to be like in the future. The information on 
the time-allocation patterns is standardized into z scores for comparability. 
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Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Independent variables:
Individual characterstics
Male indicator 310 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Eldest 313 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Eldest × Male 310 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Youngest 313 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Youngest × Male 310 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
No. of younger siblings 310 1.76 1.42 0.00 7.00
No. of elder siblings 310 2.64 2.32 0.00 11.00
Having role-modelled person 310 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Time-allocation patterns (in z scores)
Studying at home 303 0.00 1.00 -1.06 5.20
Playing 303 0.00 1.00 -0.76 7.07
Weekly frequency of going to school 303 0.00 1.00 -2.67 1.67
Helping for father's job 303 0.00 1.00 -0.43 6.75
Helping for mother's job 303 0.00 1.00 -0.43 5.35
Helping for household chores 303 0.00 1.00 -1.23 4.04
Computer-game shop usage 303 0.00 1.00 -0.42 9.34
Household characteristics
Father's education 294 8.92 3.18 1.00 14.00
Mother's education 308 9.01 3.17 2.00 14.00
log per capita income 310 6.90 1.16 0.00 9.72
Father's age 310 46.97 7.72 31.00 74.00
Mother's age 292 40.91 6.81 31.00 73.00
Having mobile phone 310 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Income share by mother's earning 308 0.20 0.28 0.00 1.00
Income share by remmittance 308 0.13 0.24 0.00 0.89
CCT beneficiary indicator 310 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Female-headed indicator 310 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Father not living together indicator 313 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Mother not living together indicator 313 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Father is land owning farmer 313 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Father is contruct farmer 313 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
Father is agricultural wage laborer 313 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
Father is fisherman 313 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Father is proprietor 313 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Working mother indicator (=1) 292 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Mother is land owning farmer 313 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Mother is proprietor 313 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
School variables: 
Public school indicator (=1) 282 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00
Filipino: Female teacher gender ratio 275 0.81 0.16 0.50 1.00
Math: Female teacher gender ratio 275 0.68 0.16 0.00 1.00
English: Female teacher gender ratio 275 0.91 0.11 0.50 1.00
Science: Female teacher gender ratio 275 0.88 0.12 0.00 1.00
Social Studies: Female teacher gender ratio 275 0.84 0.08 0.50 1.00
MAPEH: Female teacher gender ratio 275 0.65 0.19 0.00 1.00
TLE: Female teacher gender ratio 275 0.72 0.23 0.00 1.00
Variables
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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B. Household Characteristics 
 On average, parents completed the third grade out of the four-year secondary 
education and thus did not complete their secondary education in full.17 Mothers generally 
completed more years of education than fathers did. On average, fathers are older than 
mothers (their wives). Out of all households, 61% have at least one mobile phone, i.e., 39% 
do not have any mobile phones. Contributions of mothers’ earnings account for 20% of their 
household incomes on average, with remittances from other family members living 
separately contributing to 13%. The beneficiary households of conditional cash transfer 
account for 38%, implying that these households are poorer than otherwise. The coresidential 
status shows that 9% of households are female-headed due to the death of husbands (fathers) 
or to separation,18 and fathers and mothers live separately in 12% and 9% of households due 
to working in another place or in a foreign country, respectively. 
 The parental job category indicators are used, letting non-primary-sector and 
proprietorial jobs be reference categories. Out of the fathers, 5%, 4%, and 8% are land-owner 
farmers, tenant farmers, and agricultural wage laborers, respectively, whereas 14% are 
fishermen and 1% are in proprietorial positions such as management. Out of the mothers, 
49% work, with most being self-employed or in the service sector. Only 1% worked in 
agriculture and none were in proprietorial positions. 
 
C. School Variables 
 School variables include the public school indicator (1 if the school is public) and 
female TGRs for each school subject. In the sample, 92% of the schools children enrolled in 
are public schools. According to the subject-level TGRs, the majority of teachers, ranging 
from 65% (MAPEH) to 91% (English), are female. 
 
D. Time-allocation Patterns between Male and Female Children 
 Appendix Table 2 further decomposes the mean values of z scores of time-allocation 
patterns by male and female. There are clearly gender differences between male and female 
children. Female children are more likely to spend more time studying at home and at school 
as well as helping with household chores compared to their male counterparts. In contrast, 
male children are more likely to spend more time playing, helping with their fathers’ work, 
and using computer game shops. Interestingly, given that more male youths are expected to 
                                                        
17 In the parents’ generation, the secondary education was for only 4 years. 
18 In the Philippines, legal divorce is not common due to the country’s adherence to Catholic rules. 
People report their marital status as “separated” if it is substantially similar to the situation of 
divorced couples. 
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contribute to their household livelihood in accordance with social norms, there is no gender 
difference on the time allocated for helping with their mothers’ work.  
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Mean Comparisons, Time-allocation Patterns 
Time-use variables (in z scores) Female Male
Studying at home 0.25 -0.29
Weekly frequency of going to school 0.23 -0.26
Playing -0.39 0.44
Helping for father's job -0.25 0.28
Helping for mother's job 0.00 0.01
Helping for household chores 0.21 -0.24
Computer-game shop usage -0.13 0.15
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
Appendix II provides supplementary information about the full reports of the estimations of 
the scores on the difference between NAT and RC scores. Appendix Table 3 presents the full 
report of results for full-model estimations in which the region effect, school effect, male-
specific part of school effect, time-allocation patterns, own-subject female TGRs and their 
interaction term with the male indicator, as well as individual and household characteristics 
are controlled for (corresponding to the results reported in Table 13 and Table 14). Let us 
overview the associations of other individual and household characteristics and time-
allocation patterns aside from male indicators. 
 
A. Individual and Household Characteristics  
 There are some variables capturing statistically significant individual and 
household characteristics, as follows. The birth-order variations do not seem to be effective 
except for being the eldest son, but children with more siblings, especially more older 
siblings, are more likely to score better on RC than on NAT; children who have role models 
within the community are more likely to score better on RC than on NAT; students who go 
to school more times per week are more likely to score better RC than on NAT; higher 
logarithmic per capita incomes predict better scores on RC than on NAT; higher income 
shares by remittances predict negative scores on RC compared to those on NATs (this can be 
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related to the instability of their livelihoods because their household livelihoods rely more 
on remittances, not on their breadwinners’ earnings); an indicator of conditional cash 
transfer beneficiary predicts slightly better scores on RC than on NAT; households with 
fathers or mothers living separately predict slightly better scores on RC than on NAT 
compared to households with cohabitating fathers or mothers; children whose fathers are 
land-owning farmers or in proprietorial positions are more likely to score better on RC than 
on NAT compared to their counterparts with fathers who are self-employed or in 
manufacturing occupations. 
 These relations show that, before mentioning teacher-perceived stereotypes, the 
above characteristics would partially predict the factors of better engagement with routine-
based school activities that can affect teachers’ evaluations on the RC scores. 
 
B. School Variables 
 Aside from school fixed effects, the following school variables are used as 
covariates: the public-school indicator (1 if the school is public), the mode of transportation 
to schools (1 if walking and 0 otherwise), school-distance information (kilometers and 
minutes from each house), female TGRs of own subjects, and their interaction terms with 
male indicator. Firstly, children enrolled in public schools are more likely to score lower 
compared to NAT than children enrolled in private schools. The results regarding the TGRs 
were interpreted in Subsection C of Section V. 
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Appendix Table 3: Full Report of Estimations 
Filipino Math English Science AP Filipino Math English Science AP
Individual characteristics:
Male indicator (=1) 2.02 1.29 0.20 0.88 1.27 13.04 68.25*** 5.66 44.59** 207.28**
[1.69] [1.19] [1.36] [1.01] [1.18] [22.41] [20.92] [17.65] [17.53] [82.82]
Eldest indicator 0.26 0.44 -0.15 0.25 0.04 0.26 0.44 -0.15 0.25 0.04
[0.62] [0.61] [0.55] [0.39] [0.58] [0.62] [0.61] [0.55] [0.39] [0.58]
Eldest son indicator -1.50 -1.94** -0.13 -1.80** -0.09 -1.50 -1.94** -0.13 -1.80** -0.09
[1.03] [0.92] [0.85] [0.82] [0.95] [1.03] [0.92] [0.85] [0.82] [0.95]
Youngest indicator -0.27 -0.72 -0.44 0.13 0.36 -0.27 -0.72 -0.44 0.13 0.36
[0.60] [0.50] [0.56] [0.41] [0.49] [0.60] [0.50] [0.56] [0.41] [0.49]
Youngest son indicator 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.77 0.29 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.77 0.29
[0.83] [1.00] [0.88] [0.78] [0.94] [0.83] [1.00] [0.88] [0.78] [0.94]
No. of elder siblings 0.22** 0.22** 0.21** 0.22** 0.22** 0.22** 0.22** 0.21** 0.22** 0.22**
[0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
Male * No. of elder siblings -0.21 -0.37** -0.16 -0.32** -0.14 -0.21 -0.37** -0.16 -0.32** -0.14
[0.14] [0.17] [0.15] [0.13] [0.16] [0.14] [0.17] [0.15] [0.13] [0.16]
No. of younger siblings 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.28** 0.38** 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.28** 0.38**
[0.19] [0.16] [0.14] [0.12] [0.15] [0.19] [0.16] [0.14] [0.12] [0.15]
Male * No. of younger siblings 0.08 0.09 -0.24 0.01 -0.38 0.08 0.09 -0.24 0.01 -0.38
[0.34] [0.37] [0.30] [0.28] [0.27] [0.34] [0.37] [0.30] [0.28] [0.27]
Role-model indicator 0.55 0.43 0.74* 0.90*** 0.34 0.55 0.43 0.74* 0.90*** 0.34
[0.33] [0.32] [0.39] [0.25] [0.36] [0.33] [0.32] [0.39] [0.25] [0.36]
Z scores, Time-allocation patterns:
Studying at home -0.28* -0.16 -0.18 -0.24* -0.03 -0.28* -0.16 -0.18 -0.24* -0.03
[0.17] [0.19] [0.18] [0.14] [0.15] [0.17] [0.19] [0.18] [0.14] [0.15]
Playing -0.64** -0.1 -0.12 -0.02 -0.50** -0.64** -0.1 -0.12 -0.02 -0.50**
[0.27] [0.25] [0.25] [0.22] [0.22] [0.27] [0.25] [0.25] [0.22] [0.22]
Weekly frequency of going to schools 0.18 0.83* 0.06 0.62* -0.1 0.18 0.83* 0.06 0.62* -0.1
[0.46] [0.43] [0.33] [0.34] [0.37] [0.46] [0.43] [0.33] [0.34] [0.37]
Helping for fathers' jobs 0.24 0.33 -0.19 -0.07 -0.08 0.24 0.33 -0.19 -0.07 -0.08
[0.18] [0.23] [0.18] [0.19] [0.20] [0.18] [0.23] [0.18] [0.19] [0.20]
Helping for mothers' jobs 0.04 -0.27 0.24 0.29 0.06 0.04 -0.27 0.24 0.29 0.06
[0.17] [0.20] [0.16] [0.18] [0.21] [0.17] [0.20] [0.16] [0.18] [0.21]
Helping for household chores 0.03 0.22 -0.27 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.22 -0.27 -0.01 0.05
[0.26] [0.22] [0.19] [0.16] [0.22] [0.26] [0.22] [0.19] [0.16] [0.22]
Computer-game shop usage -0.25 -0.23 0.07 -0.05 0.72** -0.25 -0.23 0.07 -0.05 0.72**
[0.31] [0.27] [0.19] [0.19] [0.29] [0.31] [0.27] [0.19] [0.19] [0.29]
Household characteristics
Fathers' education 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06
[0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06]
Mothers' education -0.09 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.09 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.02
[0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06]
log per capita income 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.31* 0.54** 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.31* 0.54**
[0.21] [0.24] [0.21] [0.17] [0.26] [0.21] [0.24] [0.21] [0.17] [0.26]
Fathers' age 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02]
Mothers' age -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.05
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04]
Having mobile phone -0.26 -0.22 0.07 0.12 -0.06 -0.26 -0.22 0.07 0.12 -0.06
[0.36] [0.34] [0.32] [0.27] [0.35] [0.36] [0.34] [0.32] [0.27] [0.35]
Income share by mothers 0.18 -1.41 -0.25 -1.36 -1.32 0.18 -1.41 -0.25 -1.36 -1.32
[1.01] [1.36] [0.89] [0.93] [0.92] [1.01] [1.36] [0.89] [0.93] [0.92]
Income share by remittance -2.02** -1.30 -2.30*** -2.11** -1.03 -2.02** -1.30 -2.30*** -2.11** -1.03
[0.98] [1.09] [0.85] [0.80] [0.99] [0.98] [1.09] [0.85] [0.80] [0.99]
CCT beneficiary indicator -0.21 0.28 -0.07 0.10 0.59* -0.21 0.28 -0.07 0.10 0.59*
[0.37] [0.35] [0.32] [0.27] [0.31] [0.37] [0.35] [0.32] [0.27] [0.31]
Female-headed indicator -0.51 1.85 -1.06 -1.55 0.72 -0.51 1.85 -1.06 -1.55 0.72
[1.17] [1.76] [1.44] [1.37] [1.66] [1.17] [1.76] [1.44] [1.37] [1.66]
Separated father indicator -0.99 -0.44 -1.24** -0.39 -0.95 -0.99 -0.44 -1.24** -0.39 -0.95
[0.64] [0.68] [0.55] [0.42] [0.62] [0.64] [0.68] [0.55] [0.42] [0.62]
Independent variables
Δz (zNAT - zRC)  without Male*TGR interactions Δz (zNAT - zRC)  with Male*TGR interactions
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Appendix Table 3: Full Report of Estimations (Cont.) 
Filipino Math English Science AP Filipino Math English Science AP
Separated mother indicator -0.14 -0.04 -0.19 -0.72* 0.62 -0.14 -0.04 -0.19 -0.72* 0.62
[0.70] [0.69] [0.60] [0.43] [0.59] [0.70] [0.69] [0.60] [0.43] [0.59]
Father: land-owning farmer 1.43** 1.69* 0.43 1.71** 1.20* 1.43** 1.69* 0.43 1.71** 1.20*
[0.60] [0.94] [0.77] [0.69] [0.60] [0.60] [0.94] [0.77] [0.69] [0.60]
Father: tenant farmer 0.31 -0.48 0.28 0.57 0.25 0.31 -0.48 0.28 0.57 0.25
[0.53] [0.61] [0.49] [0.51] [0.60] [0.53] [0.61] [0.49] [0.51] [0.60]
Father: agricultural wage laborer -0.56 -0.38 0.33 0.02 0.70 -0.56 -0.38 0.33 0.02 0.70
[0.61] [0.66] [0.42] [0.43] [0.48] [0.61] [0.66] [0.42] [0.43] [0.48]
Father: fisherman -0.16 -0.58 -0.14 -0.27 0.14 -0.16 -0.58 -0.14 -0.27 0.14
[0.47] [0.42] [0.45] [0.36] [0.54] [0.47] [0.42] [0.45] [0.36] [0.54]
Father: proprietor 1.41 1.61* 1.16 1.31 0.81 1.41 1.61* 1.16 1.31 0.81
[1.03] [0.88] [1.00] [0.80] [0.94] [1.03] [0.88] [1.00] [0.80] [0.94]
Working mother indicator 0.1 0.82 0.09 0.25 0.22 0.1 0.82 0.09 0.25 0.22
[0.58] [0.64] [0.50] [0.45] [0.48] [0.58] [0.64] [0.50] [0.45] [0.48]
Mother: land-owning farmer 0.97 0.49 1.82 1.13 0.09 0.97 0.49 1.82 1.13 0.09
[0.81] [1.02] [1.19] [0.86] [0.84] [0.81] [1.02] [1.19] [0.86] [0.84]
School variables
Public school indicator (=1) -1.78 -3.61*** -2.77** -2.33** -1.62 -1.78 -3.61*** -2.77** -2.33** -1.62
[1.32] [1.27] [1.25] [1.12] [1.24] [1.32] [1.27] [1.25] [1.12] [1.24]
Indiactor of walking to school (=1) 0.57 0.24 0.13 0.69 -0.55 0.57 0.24 0.13 0.69 -0.55
[0.50] [0.49] [0.44] [0.46] [0.46] [0.50] [0.49] [0.44] [0.46] [0.46]
Distance to school (km) -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.09
[0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.08]
Minutes to schools (min.) -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
Female TGR (own subject) -0.10 -7.85 -10.13 -24.06 -88.34 -0.10 -7.85 -10.13 -24.06 -88.34
[15.18] [19.81] [14.16] [20.72] [113.39] [15.18] [19.81] [14.16] [20.72] [113.39]
Male × Female TGR (own subject) -12.68 -94.32*** -5.94 -53.31** -239.54**
[24.27] [28.69] [20.23] [20.73] [95.54]
Constant 1.49 6.21 10.29 17.55 70.22 1.49 6.21 10.29 17.55 70.22
[14.21] [15.05] [12.48] [17.55] [97.77] [14.21] [15.05] [12.48] [17.55] [97.77]
Adj. R 2 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.37 0.30 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.37 0.30
No. of Obs. 115 113 115 111 104 115 113 115 111 104
Independent variables
Δz (zNAT - zRC)  without Male×TGR interactions Δz (zNAT - zRC)  with Male×TGR interactions
 
*** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01.  
Notes: Numbers in brackets are robust standard errors. The full-model estimations in which the 
region effect, school effect, male-specific part of school effect, and time-allocation patterns 
are controlled for. 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
 
